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We analyze the economic dynamics in a basic New Keynesian model adjusted for imperfect, het-
erogeneous knowledge and adaptive learning. The policy, represented by a forward-looking Taylor
rule, is driven by the central bank’s own internal forecasts, whereas the core economic dynamics
are driven by private agents’ expectations. We study the implications of disagreement between
those two. We ﬁnd that if there is expectations heterogeneity, monetary policy should be less ac-
tive in its actions in order to be short-run stability improving, and to affect positively the speed
of convergence towards the ﬁrst best equilibrium in the long run. This is in contrast to the ho-
mogeneous incomplete knowledge literature, which predicts the opposite. We also ﬁnd that the
homogeneous expectations economy is easier to operate in for monetary policy, and that policy
can be more effective than in the heterogeneous expectations economy. From the perspective of
incomplete, heterogeneous knowledge and adaptive learning methodology, we can thus see the
importance of good communication policy and monetary policy credibility.
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Nontechnical Summary
In standard monetary models used for policy analysis, economic agents are assumed to share the same,
complete knowledge, that is, a representative agent knows perfectly the model structure and behavior.
The mainstream monetary theory is based on this simpliﬁcation of reality. Recently, however, there has
been a growing interest in relaxing that assumption. Agents still share the same knowledge, but, it is not
complete any more. Only a part of the theoretical, complete economic knowledge is available to eco-
nomic agents, and this knowledge might also vary among them.A natural extension is for heterogeneous,
incomplete knowledge and expectations.
Our objective is to contribute to the discussion on incomplete, heterogeneous knowledge and its conse-
quences for monetary policy. Our particular interest is in the relation between policy activity, willingness
to learn, economic variability and the speed of convergence to the ﬁrst best equilibrium. That is, if eco-
nomic agents do not share the same expectations, can a central bank effectively improve the short-run
economic stability as predicted by the incomplete, homogeneous knowledge literature? By stability we
mean minimization of the deviations from the ﬁrst best, rational complete expectations, in terms of both
amplitude and time.
If knowledge is homogeneous, inﬂation hawkiness helps to decrease inﬂation variability and speed up
learning. If knowledge and beliefs are heterogeneous, the results suggest that policy ought not to be an
inﬂation hawk as variability increases and the speed of convergence slows. For the central bank to play its
role effectively in the heterogeneous information world and help the economy converge to the ﬁrst best
equilibrium, policy ought to be conservative and focus on information and knowledge homogenization
in the economy.
This ﬁnding is crucial for monetary policy based on calibrated models. If monetary policy relies on a
calibrated model which is not updated with respect to new information too much or too often, it may in
theory be harmful to economic stability. This is the case, especially, if other economic agents use, for
instance, simple statistical models.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 3
1. Introduction
Unlike in the commonly considered representative agent macroeconomic models, in reality there exists a
diversity among economic agents (consumers, businessmen, bankers or stock market brokers, monetary
policy authorities etc.). The diversity is mirrored in the agents’ economic knowledge and how they
perceive current and expect future economic development. In Mankiw and Wolfers (2003), we can ﬁnd
some empirical evidence on inﬂation expectations in the US which documents heterogeneity in agents’
expectations. Similar observations can also be made in other economies.
In standard monetary models used for policy analysis, economic agents are assumed to share the same,
complete knowledge, that is, a representative agent knows perfectly the model structure and behavior.
The mainstream monetary theory is based on this simpliﬁcation of reality. Recently, however, there
has been a growing interest in relaxing that assumption. Agents still share the same knowledge, but,
it is not complete any more. Only a part of the theoretical, complete economic knowledge is available
to economic agents, and this knowledge might also vary among them. Examples of this stream in the
adaptive learning literature with application to monetary policy issues include Orphanides and Williams
(2003), Bullard and Mitra (2002), and many others. A natural extension is for heterogeneous, incomplete
knowledgeandexpectations. ExamplesofsuchliteratureincludeEvansandHonkapohja(2003a), Dennis
and Ravenna (2005), and others. This stream of literature particularly focuses on economic system
stability under incomplete, heterogeneous knowledge. There is a lack of literature studying implied
economic dynamics under heterogeneous expectations.
Our objective is to contribute to the discussion on incomplete, heterogeneous knowledge and its conse-
quences for monetary policy. Our particular interest is in the relation between policy activity, willingness
to learn, economic variability and the speed of convergence to the ﬁrst best equilibrium. That is, if eco-
nomic agents do not share the same expectations, can a central bank effectively improve the short-run
economic stability as predicted by the incomplete, homogeneous knowledge literature? By stability we
mean minimization of the deviations from the ﬁrst best, rational complete expectations, in terms of both
amplitude and time.
In contrast to the rational and complete-knowledge world, in the incomplete-knowledge world the econ-
omy is not in its ﬁrst best equilibrium. Knowledge improvement is thus welfare improving. Attaining
the ﬁrst best (rational expectations) equilibrium is linked to the agents’ willingness to learn. In the
homogeneous-knowledge case, monetary policy can contribute to knowledge improvement (learning).
Orphanides and Williams (2003) ﬁnd that monetary policy ought to be inﬂation vigilant, favoring pol-
icy activity as short-run stability improving. Ferrero (2003) qualiﬁes this conclusion. It holds only in
a simple structured model (agents form expectations about only one variable). The answer complexity
grows with model complexity. For instance, if agents already form expectations about two variables, a
too active policy does not need to be necessarily welfare-improving.4 Martin Fukaˇ c
The paper by Orphanides and Williams (2003) is one of the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of imperfect
knowledge and perpetual adaptive learning on macroeconomic dynamics and the conduct of optimal
monetary policy. The authors ﬁnd two basic results: (i) ”policies that would be efﬁcient under ratio-
nal expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect”, Orphanides and Williams (2003,
p.26), and (ii) ”policy should respond more aggressively to inﬂation under imperfect knowledge than un-
der perfect knowledge... in order to anchor inﬂation expectations and foster macroeconomic stability”,
Orphanides and Williams (2003, p.26).
The results are obtained with a very basic model consisting of the Lucas supply curve and a simple
inﬂation targeting rule. In the light of the simplicity of the model, Evans (2003) questions the second
result above. For him, there is no clear answer as to whether the policy maker should be biased towards
inﬂation vigilance under imperfect knowledge.
Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) provide a review and extension of the recent work on monetary policy
under learning. They also investigate, among other things, the consequences of different beliefs between
private agents and policy-makers about the true structure of the economy. They show that expectations-
based policy rules allow for E-stability and determinacy, even if the beliefs of private agents and the
central bank differ. E-stability and determinacy also exist if the central bank adopts the private agents’
beliefs when setting its instruments. The same result is found in Bullard and Mitra (2002).
The authors use the concept of (ﬁnite-horizon) Euler-equation learning. But it should be mentioned that
there is also another view on the issue. Preston (2004) has addressed the problem from the perspective of
inﬁnite learning and produced different results. In Preston’s approach, if both agents and policy-makers
are learning about the model structure, and the central bank adopts the private agents’ expectations for its
decisions without considering how they are formed, it may result in a self-fulﬁlling expectation problem
and macroeconomic instability. Preston argues in favor of policy rules based on the bank’s own forecasts.
Honkapohja et al. (2003) react by showing that the approach of inﬁnite learning in Preston (2004) does
not invalidate the results based on Euler equation learning and demonstrate that Preston’s approach can
be replicated under plausible assumptions in the Euler-equation learning approach.
Our paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the model environment and deﬁne the basic ter-
minology to be used throughout the paper. In the next, second, section we also analyze the equilibrium
properties of the workhorse model under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. In the third
section we study the model dynamic behavior. First, we set up a benchmark by presenting impulse
responses for the homogeneous-knowledge case, we then consequently move our attention to the hetero-
geneous knowledge case. We describe our simulation results and provide a basic economic intuition for
them. We conclude with a fourth section discussing the results and drawing possible implications for
monetary policy.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 5
2. The Model Environment
2.1 The Model
Our workhorse model follows the standard New Keynesian business cycle model scheme. On the one
hand, there are households who make decisions about consumption, labour, and money holdings in order
tomaximizeandsmooththeirlifetimewelfare. Ontheotherhand, thereisamonopolisticallycompetitive
production sector that maximizes proﬁts by controlling output, output prices and labour demand. The
ﬁrms use Calvo’s pricing mechanism to set prices. The central bank’s objective seeks to anchor the
nominal side of the economy and stabilize output variability. The model is derived from ﬁrst principles
in Appendix A.
The linearized model characterizing the aggregate economic dynamics is given by the IS curve (2.1),
which comes from the households’ Euler equation linearization, and the Phillips curve (2.2), which is
the linearized ﬁrms’ oligopolistic pricing rule. The central bank’s policy rule is given by (2.3). In the
complete-knowledge environment, the aggregated sticky-price model takes the form
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾ (it ¡ Et¼t+1) + vt; (2.1)
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ¸xt + ut; (2.2)
it = µ0 + µ¼Et¼t+1 + µxEtxt+1: (2.3)
xt is the output gap, deﬁned as the deviation of actual output from the output arising in a friction-less
environment. ¼t is the inﬂation rate, and it is the interest rate set by the central bank. vt and ut are
demand and cost-push shocks, respectively, assumed to follow AR(1) processes. ¯, ¾, ¸, µ¼ and µx
are households’ time preference parameter, risk aversion parameter, inﬂation-elasticity-with-respect-to-
output-gap parameter, and the weights in the policy rule on inﬂation and the output gap, respectively.
The model (2.1)-(2.3) assumes that all economic agents have complete knowledge about the structure
of the economy and all expectations operators Et(:) = Et(:j­t) stand for complete knowledge rational
expectations, with ­t = f(2:1) ¡ (2:3);vt;ut;:::g.
The expectations-based policy rule (2.3) represents optimal discretionary policy. Evans and Honkapohja
(2003b) derive an optimal policy rule when a central bank employs an internal forecast. We slightly
deviatefromtheirrulebyassumingthatthecentralbankcannotobservetheshocksfvt;utgwhenmaking
policy decisions. The rule then takes the form of (2.3) with parameters fµ¼;µxg = f1 + ((1 ¡ ®)¸2 +
®)¡1¾¡1(1 ¡ ®)¸¯;¾¡1g, where ® 2 (0;1) is the relative preference for output stabilization in the
central bank’s quadratic objective function:
min Et[®x2
t + (1 ¡ ®)(¼t ¡ ¼¤)2];
where the central bank minimizes output gap ﬂuctuations and deviations of inﬂation from the desired
rate ¼¤. For simplicity, we will assume ¼¤ = 0, which implies µ0 = 0. The complete derivation of the
optimal weights can be found in Appendix D.6 Martin Fukaˇ c
In our analysis, the assumption that the complete information set ­t is available to all agents is relaxed.
Instead, we will assume agents have imperfect and, moreover, heterogeneous knowledge, which will
affect the way agents form their expectations. We will distinguish two groups of agents: (i) private agents
- households, ﬁrms, and (ii) the central bank. In the following analysis we will distinguish between the
expectation operators which these two groups form. We will assume expectations homogeneity within
each group but heterogeneity between them, that is, all households and ﬁrms will share the same set of
information and beliefs, but, this set will differ from the information set and beliefs of the central bank.
This is a signiﬁcant relaxation of the original, homogeneous, complete knowledge set-up. On the other
hand we make a simplifying assumption that each group of agents ignores the expectations of the other
group by assuming that the world is homogeneous and they all have the same information. This will,
however, be relaxed in future research.
Finally, the workhorse model in this paper takes the form
xt = ^ EP
t xt+1 ¡ ¾
³
^ EP




¼t = ¯ ^ EP
t ¼t+1 + ¸xt + ut; (2.5)
it = µ0 + µ¼ ^ ECB
t ¼t+1 + µx ^ ECB
t xt+1; (2.6)
where we speciﬁcally distinguish between the form of expectations formed by private agents, ^ EP
t (:) =
Et(:j­P
t ), and by the central bank ^ ECB
t (:) = Et(:j­CB
t ), where ­P
t ;­CB
t ½ ­t. Honkapohja et al.
(2003) show that the move from the complete knowledge model to the imperfect and heterogeneous
knowledge model is possible under Euler-equation learning. If all agents are adaptively learning (using
recursive least squares, and the E-stability conditions hold), the originally heterogeneous knowledge ­P
t
and ­CB
t enriches over time so that it converges to the complete knowledge set ­t.
To complete the model, we have to describe the learning mechanism. Besides the incomplete knowledge
and heterogeneity between the private agents’ and central bank’s expectations, we assume agents are
adaptively learning, i.e., they are improving their knowledge about the economy over time, and based
upon the past mistakes they made in the anticipation of economic developments. As mentioned above,
under certain conditions, if all agents are improving their knowledge over time, the economy converges
to the complete knowledge case eventually. The complete knowledge case, the rational expectations
equilibrium (REE), is a limiting case of the incomplete-knowledge case.
To introduce the adaptive learning methodology, we assume that agents are learning the reduced form of
the model. The minimum-state representation to the structural model (2.4)-(2.6) can be shown to be
Yt = a + bst:
Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, st is the vector of exogenous shocks, and fa;bg are the matrices
of the structural parameters.
If we say that the agents have imperfect and heterogeneous knowledge, we assume that the agents’
perception of the economy does not correspond to the complete knowledge case and, further, knowledgeHeterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 7
differs between the agents. It is assumed that the private agents’ perceived law of motion (PLM) for the
economy (4)-(6) takes the form
Yt = ^ aP
t +^ bP
t st;
and the central bank’s PLM is






t for i = fP;CBg are the time-varying matrices of the model primitives. We
implicitly assume here that agents have complete knowledge about the structure of the economy but
they have incomplete knowledge about the true values of some model primitives. However, they are
learning about the structural matrices fa;bg over time. The learning mechanism is based on recursive





t Xt(Yt ¡ X0
t»i
t¡1); (2.7)
Rt = Rt¡1 + ·t(XtX0
t ¡ Rt¡1): (2.8)
where i = fP;CBg, »i
t = [vec(^ ai)0vec(^ bi)0]0 is the vector of the perceived-law-of-motion parameters,
Xt is the matrix of appropriately stacked exogenous shocks st, and ·i
t is the information gain.1 Later in
the text we pay close attention to the gain speciﬁcation, since it will be the primary and only source of
heterogeneity.
Before we proceed, it is useful to formalize some terminology to be used throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 1 Economic agents have complete knowledge if an information set ­t is available at time t,
where
­t = f(2:4) ¡ (2:6);ut;vt;:::g:
(2.4)-(2.6) denote the agents’ knowledge of the structural relations. The information also contains true
steady-state values ¹ a¼, ¹ ax and current and past exogenous shocks ut and vt.
Deﬁnition 2 Economic agents have incomplete, homogeneous knowledge if all agents share the same
and incomplete information set ^ ­t at time t, where
^ ­t = f(2:4) ¡ (2:6);^ a¼;t; ^ xx;t;·t;ut;vt;:::g:
^ a¼;t, ^ xx;t, and · are the incomplete beliefs about inﬂation and output-gap steady states and willingness
to learn, respectively. The incomplete knowledge ^ ­t is a subset of the complete knowledge, ^ ­t ½ ­t,
and as t ¡! 1, ^ ­t ¡! ­t.
1 In the text below we also call this as willingness to learn or sensitivity to new information. These terms are used interchange-
ably.8 Martin Fukaˇ c
Deﬁnition 3 We distinguish two groups of agents: (P) private agents, and (CB) the central bank. The
private agents and central bank have incomplete, heterogeneous knowledge if the information they have
differs and it is not complete, i.e., ^ ­P
t 6= ^ ­CB
t ½ ­t. The individual information sets are
^ ­P





t = f(2:4) ¡ (2:6);^ aCB
¼;t ; ^ xCB
x;t ;·CB
t ;ut;vt;:::g:
In the next section we brieﬂy outline the adaptive learning methodology. Speciﬁcally, we analyze under
what conditions the model has a unique and stable equilibrium, and under what conditions such an
equilibrium is learnable with a recursive least squares mechanism.
2.2 Model Analysis Under Adaptive Learning
To analyze the conditions under which the incomplete knowledge model (2.4)-(2.7) converges to the
true model, REE form, the methodology developed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is employed. In
principle the methodology consists of two parts. First, the rational expectation equilibrium of the model
is examined. We look for conditions under which the REE is determined. The REE is said to be deter-
mined if it is found to be unique. The second part of the methodology is a check for the learnability of the
REE. The question is, if economic agents have incomplete knowledge, can they learn, given a learning
mechanism, the true RE dynamics? The conditions that guarantee the REE is attainable under the adap-
tive learning mechanism are called the E-stability conditions. For technical details on the methodology
we refer to Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a), where adaptive learning
in a homogeneous environment is explained, and to Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) for an extension to
heterogeneous learning.
REE Determinacy
To examine the rational expectation equilibrium of the model (2.4)-(2.6) we begin by rewriting the model
in a matrix reduced form
Yt = M1 ^ EP
t Yt+1 + M2 ^ ECB
t Yt+1 + Pst; (2.9)













¡Áµu 1 ¡ Áµg
1 ¡ ¸Áµu ¸(1 ¡ Áµg)
#
:
To analyze the REE determinacy, we will assume for now a complete knowledge environment, ^ EP
t (:) =
^ ECB
t (:) = Et(:). Given that, rearranging the reduced form one obtains
Yt = MEtYt+1 + Pst; (2.10)Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 9
where M = M1 + M2.
Proposition 4 The model (2.4)-(2.6) has a unique and stable rational expectations equilibrium if the
modulus of the eigenvalues of matrix M in (2.10) lies inside the unit circle.
Proof follows from the properties of the stable FODE system.
E-Stability
The second important issue is to analyze the conditions under which the REE is learnable. We know
that the REE exists and is unique. We are now interested in whether, having incomplete knowledge, we
can learn the REE eventually. We will follow the methodology by Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) for
heterogeneous adaptive learning based on recursive least squares. If the REE is determined, the model
has the minimum state variable (MSV) representation
Yt = a + bst: (2.11)
a, and b are the (3x1) and (3x3) matrices of the model primitives. Their exact form is derived in Appendix
B.
We recall that the private agents’ PLM is
Yt = ^ aP
t +^ bP
t st; (2.12)
and the central bank’s PLM is
Yt = ^ aCB
t +^ bCB
t st: (2.13)
The subscript t on the matrices indicates the time dependence of the matrices as the agents learn using
(2.7) and (2.8). The private agents and central bank use their PLMs to form expectations
^ EP




t Yt+1 = ^ aCB
t +^ bCB
t Fst: (2.15)










P + M1^ bP





The mapping from PLM to ALM is formalized to
T[a;b] = [M1^ aP
t + M2^ aCB
t ;P + M1^ bP
t F + M2^ bCB
t F]: (2.17)10 Martin Fukaˇ c
Finally, E-stability is achieved if the steady state in the following differential equation is locally stable
d
d¿
(a;b) = T[a;b] ¡ (a;b): (2.18)
Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) show that the map (2.17) can be sim-
pliﬁed. They show that the E-stability conditions in the case of heterogeneous expectations are equiva-
lent (under least squares learning) to the homogeneous expectations case. Assuming ^ jP
t = ^ jCB
t = ^ jt for
j = fa;bg, then (2.17) simpliﬁes to
T[a;b] =
h
(M1 + M2)^ at;P + (M1 + M2)^ btF
i
: (2.19)
Proposition 5 The REE of the model (2.4)-(2.7) is E-stable under heterogeneous expectations if and
only if the corresponding model with homogeneous expectations is E-stable. Hence the modulus of the
eigenvalues of
DTa(a) = I ­ (M1 + M2)
DTb(b) = F0 ­ (M1 + M2)
must lie inside the unit circle.
Proof see Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) for the proof of the ﬁrst statement and Appendix C for the
derivation of DTa(a), and DTb(b).
3. Model Dynamics and the Implications of Monetary Policy
Having described the model and its equilibrium, we can turn our attention to its dynamic properties. The
goal of this paper is to investigate what new expectations heterogeneity brings to the model dynamics
and how the monetary policy implications are or may be affected.
To address our objective we take the strategy of analyzing the model impulse responses. We begin
with the homogeneous case where both private agents and the central bank evaluate innovations in their
forecasts in the same manner. They have the same sensitivity to new information (·P
t = ·CB
t = ·t).
The simulation begins from the REE, i.e. complete knowledge. A temporary shock hits the economy. It
is a one-period shock and, for the baseline simulation, it is assumed to be of unit magnitude. The shock
is either a cost-push shock (ut) or a demand shock (gt), or a combination of the two.
The strategy is the following. First, we describe the results from the point of view of the effect of
monetary policy on inﬂation and output gap responses and their deviations from the RE dynamics, and
the effect of policy on the speed of convergence. Second, we do the same and examine the effect of
new-information sensitivity. We describe the results ﬁrst, and we then provide an economic intuition.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 11
Model calibration The model is calibrated using Clarida et al. (2000) as a benchmark, i.e. ¾ = 1,
¯ = 0:99, and ¸ = 0:3. To derive the optimal weights for (6), it is assumed that the central bank’s
preference parameter is ® = 0:3. This value is also assumed when evaluating the central bank’s loss
with changing µ¼ (deviating from its optimal value, which is implied under homogeneous expectations).
In all the simulations, we assume an econometric learning algorithm which is consistent with·i
t = cit¡1,
where t denotes time, i = fCB;PAg, and ci is a positive constant and represents a bias in the gain. If
ci = 1, ·i
t represents standard econometric learning. If ci > 1, it implies a greater willingness to
update the model parameters than under standard econometric learning. If, for instance, cCB = 1 and
cPA = 1:5, we say that private agents are more willing to update their forecasting models than a central
bank is. As ·i
t ! 0 as t ! 1, the effect of ci 6= 1 is relevant only shortly after the shock hits and does
not affect the REE.
Before we proceed with the incomplete knowledge cases, let us ﬁrst outline the complete knowledge
model dynamics and monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Rational expectations (RE) dynamics Assuming no persistence in exogenous shocks, if a positive
demand shock hits the economy, causing excess demand, then output rises above its equilibrium level.
The excess demand pushes prices higher and thus inﬂation increases. The effect of the demand shock on
inﬂation depends on the output gap elasticity. Since shocks are assumed not to be persistent and given
the forward-looking Taylor type policy rule, policy does not react to the shock. If the shock is persistent,
monetary policy anticipates its future value and its effect on output, and raises the interest rate. Given
that the Taylor principle must hold, the real interest rate increases. With the the opportunity costs of
not-consuming falling, agents lower their demand for consumption goods and output decreases.
A cost-push shock has a different transition. If it is not persistent, it only affects the inﬂation rate without
spreading further across the economy. There is a one-time change in the price level. If the shock is
persistent, monetary policy now reacts. Fighting a cost-push shock, monetary policy has to affect the
real economy, which is the only transmission channel to ﬁght inﬂation. If a positive cost-push shock
hits, the central bank raises the interest rate so that real output drops below its equilibrium value and thus
creates disinﬂationary pressure to counteract the cost-push shock’s inﬂationary pressure.
3.1 Homogeneous Learning Case
We can ﬁnally concentrate our attention on the economy with incomplete knowledge and adaptive learn-
ing. First, we describe and provide an interpretation of the homogeneous environment results and then
we turn to the heterogeneous environment results, where the model has more degrees of freedom, making
the model dynamics richer.
We are going to summarize the results using two measures to characterize the properties of an impulse
response function. We report the maximum deviation of the adaptive learning (AL) dynamics from the
RE dynamics, which is denoted in the summary tables as max. If max is a positive number, the AL
economy responds more to a shock than the RE economy. If max is a negative number, the AL economy
is less responsive to a shock than the RE economy. It could be interpreted as an improvement in the12 Martin Fukaˇ c
RE economy’s dynamics. Taking an absolute value of max, we capture the absolute difference between
the impulse response in the RE economy and the AL economy. The second measure we employ to
characterize the speed of convergence of AL to the RE dynamics is the shock half-life measure (HL).
For this paper, HL is the number of periods between max and max/2, i.e. how many periods are needed
to halve the original maximum amplitude.
The results for the homogeneous knowledge case are summarized in Table 3.1. We report the percentage
deviations from the RE dynamics caused by an individual shock. As said above, a positive number refers
to dynamics which are more volatile (in terms of a higher output gap or inﬂation) than in the RE case. A
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Demand shock The transmission of a demand shock in an adaptive learning environment has very
similar implications for inﬂation and the output gap as under rational expectations. The economy be-
comes, however, more responsive to the shock. Deviations of inﬂation and the output gap from the RE
dynamics take positive values. Monetary policy inﬂuences the dynamics. In terms of inﬂation, if mone-
tary policy is inﬂation averse, it helps to lower the difference between the RE and AL dynamics. It also
speeds up the convergence of AL to RE.
The output gap under AL is less responsive to the demand shock than under RE. Inﬂation vigilant policy
increases this deviation and with increasing inﬂation aversion the response of the output gap lowers.
Similarly as in the case of inﬂation, inﬂation vigilant policy helps to speed up the convergence.
The loss function summarizes the total effect of the demand shock from the point of view of a central
bank. As can be anticipated from the inﬂation and output gap dynamics, inﬂation averse monetary policy
improves the bank’s loss function and helps to close the gap between the AL and RE dynamics. It also
positively contributes to the speed of convergence.
The effect of the sensitivity to new information is very similar to the effect of monetary policy. As can
also be observed in Table 3.1, it contributes to higher inﬂation sensitivity, which is on the other hand
offset by faster convergence to the RE dynamics and to the REE, respectively. For the output gap, the
implications are also similar. Higher sensitivity to new information yields a higher deviation from the
RED. In fact, it causes an improvement in the dynamics. It makes the output gap less responsive to the
shock. In summary, from the loss function perspective summarized in Table 3.3, the more the system is
new-information sensitive, the higher the overall system response, which is, however, followed by faster
convergence.
The intuition for the observed results might be as follows. The demand shock ﬁrst hits the output gap
by pushing real output above its equilibrium level and then transmits to inﬂation by raising the price
of consumption goods. If the shock is not persistent the interest rate does not react because inﬂation
and output gap expectations are not affected further. We can, however, observe a bias in the dynamics
because of learning. The shock is not anticipated and creates a wedge between what is expected and
the reality. Agents partially interpret the higher-than-expected inﬂation and output gap as a mistake of
their forecasting model. They will adjust it. A positive demand shock raises inﬂation and the output
gap above their expectations, and agents translate this as their model underestimating the variables.
They adjust/improve the model so that it forecasts higher values in the future. The adjustment raises
expectations and thus interest rates, which temporarily increases the real rate and lowers the impact
of the demand shock. In the end, the response of the output gap to the demand shock is lower than
under RE. The indirect effect of interest rates on inﬂation via the lower output gap (lower than in the
RE environment), outweighs the effect of the higher inﬂation rate expectations, which, under the current
calibration, affects inﬂation in a one-to-one ratio but the output gap in a one-to-one-third ratio (since
¸ = 0:3). If monetary policy becomes more responsive to inﬂation, it helps to eliminate the shock and
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Cost-push shock A cost-push shock directly inﬂuences inﬂation and temporarily transmits to the
output gap via inﬂation expectations and the real interest rate. If the shock is persistent, a surprise in
inﬂation today affects future expectations. If monetary policy is effective, it will act to bring inﬂation
back to the equilibrium/targeted value. By changing the interest rate, the central bank may neutralize the
effect of the higher expected inﬂation on the ex ante real return and consequently on output. The policy
responsiveness to the cost-push shock affects the speed at which the economy adjusts back to the REE.
This is under the assumption that all agents in the economy know the true structure of the economy and
they recognize that any surprise in expectations is caused by exogenous shocks and not by a forecasting
model mis-speciﬁcation.
If agents put some weight on the model mis-speciﬁcation possibility, they would favor the doubt by ad-
justing their model parameters. In such a case, the economy deviates from the RE dynamics. At time t a
cost-push shock hits the economy and inﬂation increases. The increase has two impacts. The ﬁrst one is
the standard effect on expectations, and the second one is due to learning. Since inﬂation is higher than
what was expected, agents are tempted to update their models, which they believe have been underesti-
mating actual inﬂation. This triggers a mechanism which brings inﬂation higher than in a complete (RE)
knowledge case. Updating their model, agents will form higher expectations about inﬂation in the future,
which positively affects actual inﬂation. Higher inﬂation expectations drive monetary policy to change
the interest rate more than the RE would require and thus decrease output more than in the optimum
case. In the IRF of inﬂation and output gap in Figure 3.1 we can observe an interesting phenomenon.
This is a period of time (about 5 periods) in which inﬂation/the output gap continues diverging from the
REE path before it begins to converge back. In the case of the output gap it means a better outcome in
the initial periods, and later, because under the RE dynamics the equilibrium is reached faster, the output
gap is bigger than in the optimum case.
In Table 3.1, we can also observe, as monetary policy is becomes inﬂation averse relative to the output
gap, that inﬂation variability decreases and the output gap increases. In this case the convergence to the
RE is faster.
The effect of sensitivity to new information is summarized in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3, where the central
bank loss function is evaluated. In general, the more the model updates are dependent on innovations, the
higher the volatility of the variables. This can be partially offset by monetary policy. On the other hand,
a higher sensitivity to innovations due to a cost-push shock helps to improve the speed of convergence to
the REE, which is important for central bank loss minimization.
We offer the following explanation of the transmission mechanism of the cost-push shock. We observe
that monetary policy improves the inﬂation dynamics while worsening the output gap dynamics. On
the other hand, it improves the speed of convergence of both. Let’s interpret the transition again by
starting with a non-persistent cost shock. A positive cost-push shock pushes inﬂation immediately up,
which is not anticipated. There is no immediate effect on the output gap, though. The mistake in the
inﬂation expectations is translated to a model update. Agents will interpret that a higher inﬂation rateHeterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 17
Figure 3.1: Impulse responses of inﬂation and the output gap to a cost-push shock under adaptive
learning - homogeneous sensitivity to innovations
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today implies higher inﬂation tomorrow and adjust their inﬂation forecasts upwards. This makes the
policy respond, and the higher interest rate will drive the output gap and inﬂation back towards the
equilibrium. The response of inﬂation and the output gap is greater in comparison to the RE case. This is
a consequence of learning and expectations formation. As the agents update their models, they forecast
higher inﬂation than it actually is/will be. This makes monetary policy react more than it should (under
RE) and thus the output gap is lower, and inﬂation higher, than it could be.
In summary, in the homogeneous case, monetary policy can inﬂuence both economic variability and the
speed of convergence to the optimum. Inﬂation aversion is paid for by higher output gap variability.
However, the speed of convergence is in all such instances faster. This observation is in line with the
basic ﬁnding in Ferrero (2004). Innovation sensitivity also positively contributes to a faster convergence.
However, in the ﬁrst periods (which are relevant for our analysis), it magniﬁes the variables’ responses
to shocks.18 Martin Fukaˇ c
Figure 3.2: The effect of sensitivity to innovations on the impulse responses of inﬂation and the output
gap (® = 0:1)
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This completes our observations on the incomplete homogeneous knowledge economy under adaptive
learning. The purpose of the presented exercise was to provide a benchmark for the coming model
extension. It should be mentioned that all the observations and presented results are in line with the
results in the literature and are standard.
3.2 Heterogeneous Learning Case
Finally, we are getting to the paper’s objective. In this section, we perform an exercise which should
reveal the New Keynesian model behavior under heterogeneous expectations and shed some light on the
implications of monetary policy in such an environment. Particularly, we want to identify the differences
thatarisefromexpectationheterogeneity. Thesystemunderconsiderationnowwillhaveonemoredegree
of freedom, allowing private agents and the central bank to form differing expectations. The dynamics
now become richer and more complicated. We will observe that some features of the homogeneous
learning economy are perceived, but in more cases the monetary policy implications are different and
may be counterintuitive. First we focus on the technical description of the results, and then we try
to provide an economic explanation. The model response functions under incomplete heterogeneous
knowledge are summarized in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
Demand shock From the summary tables it appears that the demand shock has very similar implica-
tions for inﬂation dynamics as in the homogeneous case. An inﬂation averse policy helps to improve the
AL dynamics and makes the deviations from the RE smaller. A difference can be found, however, in the
implications of new-information sensitivity. Using only rough measures from the numerical simulations
we can identify two patterns. With an increasing sensitivity to new information of private agents, inﬂa-
tion becomes more sensitive/responsive to a shock, which is, however, followed by faster convergence.
On the other hand, inﬂation becomes less sensitive to a demand shock if the central bank is more new-
information sensitive. But this implies slower convergence (higher inﬂation persistence). Further, we canHeterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 19
also observe that if the private sector’s sensitivity is higher than the central bank’s one, inﬂation is less
responsive to a shock. This, however, implies a convergence speed which is slower. If the private sector
is less sensitive than the central bank, inﬂation responds slightly more to a shock, but the convergence is
faster.
To describe the dynamics of the output gap is not that straightforward and the response to a demand
shock seems ambiguous. A big role is now played by the effect of monetary policy. An inﬂation-averse
policy makes the output gap respond less to the demand shock than under RE. The implications for
the speed of convergence are not clear. When ·PA < 1:2, the inﬂation-averse policy speeds up the
convergence. If ·PA = 1:2, the effect is inverse. A higher information sensitivity of the central bank
makes the output gap respond less to a demand shock than under the REE, but again the implications for
the speed are not monotonous. The effect of private sector information sensitivity has more complicated
implications. If the central bank is less inﬂation vigilant than under the optimal RE rule (µ¼ = 1:3), with
growing private sector information sensitivity, the output gap reacts more to the shock, and from being
less responsive than in RE, it ends up with a higher response than in RE. On the other hand, if policy is
more inﬂation averse (µ¼ = 2:5), the output gap always reacts less than in RE, and with higher private
sector information sensitivity, the reaction becomes smaller. For the speed of convergence it holds that
if the central bank’s new-information sensitivity is less than that of the private sector, the convergence
speed suffers. If private agents update their model more in reaction to an exogenous shock than the
central bank, the output gap converges to the RE dynamics faster.
Even though the demand shock transmission is very complex in the case of inﬂation and the output gap, if
we evaluate it from the central bank’s loss function perspective, the picture becomes sharper and allows
for simpler conclusions about the policy’s implications, as the effect of inﬂation dominates. Simply
put, with an inﬂation-vigilant policy the central bank’s loss decreases and the speed of convergence to
the REE increases. This is what we observed in the homogeneous case. The loss also decreases if
the central bank is more sensitive to new information. This is accompanied by slower convergence.
The private sector’s behavior acts in the opposite direction. If it is more information sensitive, it has a
positive effect on the central bank loss, but it also implies faster convergence. From the perspective of
the loss function response to the demand shock, the best state is if monetary policy is inﬂation vigilant
(µ¼ = 2:5), and the central bank and the private sector both share the same, low sensitivity to new
information (·CB = ·PA = 0:8). From the perspective of the speed of convergence, it is still a better
conﬁguration if the central bank is inﬂation averse and has a lower sensitivity to new information than
the private sector.
Cost-push shock Monetary policy has the same implications for inﬂation as in the previous case. It
lowers the deviations from the RE dynamics and speeds the convergence. Sensitivity to new information
also has the same implications as above. With increasing sensitivity of the central bank we observe
smaller deviations in inﬂation and a slower convergence speed. On the other hand, with increasing
sensitivity to new information on the part of the private sector, inﬂation variability increases and so does
the convergence speed.20 Martin Fukaˇ c
On the other hand, the output gap becomes more responsive to a demand shock as monetary policy be-
comes more inﬂation averse. Such a policy, however, contributes to faster convergence. The implication
is not monotonous, however, as can be seen in the case when ·PA = 0:8. We can observe faster conver-
gence under the optimal RE policy setting µ¼ = 1:3. In contrast to the private sector’s new-information
sensitivity, the central bank’s sensitivity to new information contributes to a higher output gap respon-
siveness and a higher convergence speed. The implications of the private sector’s sensitivity are not that
straightforward. If µ¼ = 1:3, the implications for the output gap responsiveness and the speed of conver-
gence are ambiguous. The result depends on the combination of f·CB;·PAg. If µ¼ = 2:5 the picture
becomes clearer. Increasing ·PA increases the output gap responsiveness and increases the convergence
speed.
From the perspective of the central bank’s loss function, an inﬂation-vigilant policy (more reactive than
the optimal policy) yields a better outcome in terms of a decrease in the total loss. The policy also
positively contributes to the convergence speed. The implications of ·CB can be divided into two di-
mensions: (i) ® = 0:5 and (ii) ·PA = f0:8;1g. Higher central bank new-information sensitivity yields
higher losses for the central bank, which are offset by a faster convergence speed. If ·CB is high (here
1.2), the monotonicity of the central bank’s information sensitivity does not hold any more. If monetary
policy is inﬂation averse (µ¼ = 2:5), the situation changes. A higher value of ·CB improves the dynam-
ics and lowers the central bank’s loss versus the RE case. This is accompanied by a prolongation of the
speed of convergence. The implications of the private sector’s sensitivity are monotonous. A higher ·PA
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Figure 3.3: The effect of sensitivity to innovations on the impulse responses of inﬂation and the output
gap (® = 0:1)
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Robustness check
We ran several experiments to check the robustness of the results with respect to the shock magnitudes.
The basic results remain mostly unchanged. As gt gets bigger in relative terms we observe a polarization
of the policy effect at the short and long horizon. When t = 1, policy that does not stress inﬂation
stabilization helps the central bank to deliver the lowest loss. As time passes, policy stressing inﬂation
stabilization slowly becomes dominant and by t = 20 it delivers the lowest central bank loss.
If ut is the dominant shock in relative terms we get a slightly different picture. At the short horizon,
there is a region where a policy ﬁghting inﬂation can improve the loss function. This policy becomes
dominant over time.
In Figure 3.4 we plot the central bank’s loss function as it develops over time and with respect to different
combinations f·PA;·CBg, and no serial combination in shocks. We observe similar results up to the
autocorrelation coefﬁcient of 0.2. Such an exercise is reasonable since learning can substitute high
autocorrelation of exogenous shocks in order to deliver the persistence in inﬂation and the output gap
often observed in the real data. This is found, for instance, by Milani (2004).Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 25
Figure 3.4: Loss function IRF at time t=1,10,20,40 (ut = 1;gt = 1)
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In Figure 3.4, we observe a different effect of monetary policy, in terms of the loss function, over time.
In early periods after a shock, a less inﬂation-responsive policy is preferred. With time a more inﬂation
responsive policy is effective. This can be interpreted by diminishing disagreement between the private
sector and central bank expectations. Over time, both groups of agents by learning converge to the same
forecasting model and thus produce similar forecasts. As the expectations become homogeneous, the
importance of inﬂation-vigilant policy rises, contributing signiﬁcantly to economic stability. What is
important to notice is that in the ﬁrst periods this does not hold and a too responsive policy can actually
considerablydestabilizetheeconomy. Thissuggeststhatwhenexpectationsareheterogeneous, monetary
policy should not be too active in order to be stability improving. This is an important observation which
we will elaborate on later in our discussion.
Economic Intuition
Despite their complexity, we try to provide a simple economic interpretation of the simulated results. It
will help us if we rewrite the model (2.4)-(2.6) as
xt = ¡'µ0 + ( ^ EPAxt+1 ¡ ^ ECBxt+1) ¡ '(µ¼ ^ ECB¼t+1 ¡ ^ EPA¼t+1) + vt
¼t = ¸'µ0 + (¸' + ¯) ^ EPA¼t+1 ¡ ®'µ¼ ^ ECB¼t+1 + ( ^ EPAxt+1 ¡ ^ ECBxt+1) + ut + ¸vt
Demand shock A demand shock hits the output gap ﬁrst and temporarily transmits to the inﬂation
rate. Given that we start from the REE, agents were expecting equilibrium values of inﬂation and the
output gap. In the RE and persistence-less environment, the shock would have just a one period impact.
Under adaptive learning it transmits via expectations to subsequent periods. Given the surprise, agents
update their forecasting models. The sensitivity to this innovation plays a role, and the implications
differ for the central bank and the private sector. The central bank’s actions should neutralize the shock.
If the central bank is sensitive to a surprise, it updates its model so that it overpredicts future inﬂation
and the output gap. A positive demand shock will cause an upward correction in the model parameters,
which will yield higher predictions of inﬂation and the output gap for the future periods. The interest rate
thus reacts to higher expected values of inﬂation and the output gap than there would be under RE. The
monetary policy is suddenly more restrictive, and we can observe a decline in the inﬂation deviations
from the REE as ·CB increases. The policy becomes more restrictive than it would be under RE (and
even under the homogeneous case), the output gap is pushed below its RE value, and the deviation
increases with monetary policy restrictiveness. In terms of the deviations from RE, the monetary policy
inﬂation vigilance and the sensitivity to new information act in the same direction.
Using the same logic, we can interpret the effect of increasing private sector sensitivity to innovations. A
demand shock transmits further to the economy via expectations, but it has different implications. Private
agents update their model similarly to the central bank. Their expectations, however, inﬂuence the eco-
nomic dynamics directly. A positive shock motivates model updates, yielding higher inﬂation and output
gap forecasts in the future. Higher output gap expectations imply a higher output gap and consequently
higher inﬂation. Higher inﬂation expectations have a direct effect on inﬂation, which increases, and an
indirect effect on the output gap via a decrease in the real interest rate, which positively inﬂuences theHeterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 27
output gap. The implications of ·PA for inﬂation and the output gap are intuitively straightforward. In
the results summary, we observed, that the implications for the output gap depend on policy responsive-
ness. If the policy rule is set in an optimal way, preferences are neutral (µ¤
¼(® = 0:3) = 1:3), and ·PA
increases the output gap responsiveness. When µ¼ = 2:5, the effect is inverse. The ﬁnal response of the
output gap thus depends on the combination of f®;·CB;·PAg. If ·CB < ·PA then the private sector’s
predictions of the output gap and inﬂation exceed the central bank’s expectations. The difference in the
output gap expectations has a positive effect on the contemporaneous output gap. The ﬁnal effect of the
inﬂation expectations depends on the policy. If the policy is such that µ¼ ^ ECB¼t+1 < ^ EPA¼t+1, then we
observe a positive effect on the output gap. This is the case when monetary policy is less inﬂation averse
(® = 0:5 and thus µ¼ goes to 1). There is a higher probability of a negative contribution of inﬂation ex-
pectations to be observed if the policy is inﬂation averse and µ¼ increases. This explains our observations
made above.
Cost-push shock Assuming no persistence in the shock, it has an immediate impact the contempora-
neous inﬂation and the prediction model updates, via which it transmits further. In the next period, since
no other shock occurs, inﬂation should return to the REE. Since the agents and the central bank update
their model and thus upward bias their expectations, the inﬂation rate and the output gap increase above
the RE values. The mechanism of monetary policy is the same as in the previous shock case. An inﬂation
averse policy pushes inﬂation down to the RE dynamics, and since the policy is now more aggressive
than under the RE, the output gap decreases more and becomes more responsive.
The central bank’s innovation sensitivity decreases the inﬂation rate responsiveness to a cost-push shock,
but increases the responsiveness of the output gap. Again, monetary policy becomes more restrictive than
under rational expectations, since the central bank predicts higher inﬂation (due to the model updates),
it tightens the interest rate, which closes the output gap, or better put pushes the output gap to negative
numbers, and the inﬂation rate returns to the RE dynamics. Thus by changing ·CB, we can explain
the decrease in the responsiveness of inﬂation accompanied by the increase in the responsiveness of the
output gap.
The private sector’s innovation sensitivity helps the cost shock to propagate to inﬂation. As private agents
become more innovation sensitive, they anticipate higher inﬂation than under full knowledge, and thus
increase the actual inﬂation rate. With increasing ·PA, agents update their models more and produce
higher forecasts of inﬂation. This immediately increases inﬂation due to higher anticipated inﬂation
in the future. Agents also update their forecasts of the output gap. They will anticipate the reaction
of the central bank, which they assume to employ the same expectations as themselves, which will
lead to a policy rate adjustment, and the output gap drops to negative numbers. Since ·PA will bias the
expectedmonetarypolicyreactionupwards, privateagentswillassumealoweroutputgapthanunderRE.
This explains why the output gap becomes more reactive if the private sector is information innovation
sensitive. This phenomenon is observable particularly if the central bank prefers inﬂation stabilization.
The message is mixed if the central bank becomes less responsive to inﬂation. The dynamic responses
in such a case become more complex, and the implications are not monotonous.28 Martin Fukaˇ c
4. Discussion and Final Remarks
The world is simpler if knowledge and beliefs are homogeneous. If knowledge is homogeneous, inﬂation
hawkiness helps to decrease inﬂation variability and speed up learning.2 If knowledge and beliefs are
heterogeneous, the results suggest that policy ought not to be an inﬂation hawk as variability increases
and the speed of convergence slows. For the central bank to play its role effectively in the heterogeneous
information world and help the economy converge to the ﬁrst best equilibrium, policy ought to be conser-
vative and focus on information and knowledge homogenization in the economy. Under such a scheme
the central bank’s interest rate policy can be the most effective.
This ﬁnding is crucial for monetary policy based on calibrated models. If monetary policy relies on a
calibrated model which is not updated with respect to new information too much, it may in theory be
harmful to economic stability. This is the case, especially, if other economic agents use, for instance,
simple statistical models. Such models are often updated whenever a new observation arrives.3
In reality, the model uncertainty is usually high. Economic agents can never be certain that their model
is the only correct one. Given the model uncertainty, if a central bank insists on its model and is less
willing to learn than the private sector, it leads to an increase in economic volatility by pushing the
economy away from the REE towards the ”equilibrium” given by the bank’s model. Moreover, if the
policy is not interest rate-smoothing, i.e., interest rates are changed in an aggressive way, it may harm
the economy.
Let us demonstrate this by assuming a situation in which an economy is initially in long-run equilibrium.
The inﬂation rate is zero. Both the central bank and private agents use models that correspond to the REE
model. The central bank is aware of that and thus is unwilling to change its model. Private agents are,
however, uncertain about their model, and they favor the doubt. Now, an inﬂationary shock arrives. Both
the central bank and private agents had expected the equilibrium (zero) inﬂation before. The central
bank does not put any weight on the unanticipated inﬂation and sets the interest rate so that it brings
inﬂation back to the REE equilibrium (to zero). Because the central bank believes (in this set-up) that the
private agents use the same model to form their forecasts, the central bank envisages that this interest rate
change delivers zero inﬂation in the next period. The private agents are, however, uncertain about their
model, and given the unanticipated inﬂation, they update their model and believe that so does the central
bank does so to. This leads them to expect that because inﬂation was high today, it is going to be high
tomorrow too. No further shock arrives. The actual inﬂation rate is a convex combination of the central
bank’sand privateagents’ expectations. Thus, the actual inﬂationrate will be higherthan what thecentral
bank expects but smaller than what private agents anticipate. The adjustment/learning process continues
in the same fashion until the REE is achieved eventually. Certainly, the tougher monetary policy is on
inﬂation, the faster the convergence back to the REE will be.
2 Ferrero (2003) provides an excellent analysis in this respect.
3 Certainly, in reality, there is a discrepancy in model updating. The discrepancy is bigger, the less monetary policy is credible
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This is an example where the central bank knows the REE. What happens, however, if the REE is not
known with certainty? If a central bank insists on its model (its view of the world), while having a
misspeciﬁed model, using the above logic it can harm the economy by pushing the economy to the
equilibrium which is implied by the incorrect model and inconsistent with the actual equilibrium. With
an increasing risk, it may also contribute to excessive instability if monetary policy is too active.
Good communication policy to gain credibility. We have drawn a conclusion that monetary policy faces
a much simpler problem and has straightforward implications in the homogeneous-expectations econ-
omy. If expectations are homogeneous and monetary policy is an inﬂation hawk then the policy losses
are relatively low. If expectations are heterogeneous and monetary policy is too active, the conclusion is
inverse. Hence it seems desirable to achieve knowledge homogeneity to make monetary policy effective.
How can knowledge homogeneity be achieved? We see two ways. First, the central bank adopts private
agents’ expectations or, second, private agents acquire the central bank’s expectations. Abstracting from
the theoretical world, neither of these is a simple task. The former will require reliable measures of such
expectations. Central banks run surveys of the private sector’s expectations about future economic devel-
opment. There is a question, however, whether the information that such surveys yield is economically
reliable, i.e., whether the data collected truly represent market expectations (those which are important
and employed in macro models), and are not subject to biases instead (due to inaccuracy of responses,
collusion-game behavior of some respondents, etc.). In fact, the central bank can never be sure, if the
data being collected are useful for immediate policy decisions. In this respect, the latter seems to be more
appealing and an easier task.
Forming its own expectations/forecasts, a central bank avoids the need to collect the private sector’s ex-
pectations and verify their reliability. Instead, a central bank can concentrate its capacities on producing
the best expectations/forecast on the market and to gain credibility of its actions. A central bank pro-
ducing the best forecasts on the market, i.e. the private sector cannot systematically outperform them,
appears to be the ﬁrst step toward expectations homogeneity. This is not sufﬁcient, of course. Another
important element for making expectations homogeneous across the economy is policy credibility. As is
argued in the standard monetary theory, an essential requirement for gaining credibility is transparency:
reasonable discussion, clariﬁcation and justiﬁcation of past policy errors and of future policy actions.
This implicitly concerns the central bank’s expectations which stand behind the policy decisions. Hence,
to make the private sector adopt the central bank’s views requires good communication of those. If
a central bank communicates well, it gains credibility (expectations becomes homogeneous), and can
contribute to economic stability by being active in its policies.30 Martin Fukaˇ c
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Appendix A
In this appendix we derive the model (2.1)-(2.3) from ﬁrst principles. The derivation is standard to the
literature; here we follow Malik (2004).
Agents
Households The households’ objective is to maximize lifetime utility. The consumption bundle, ct,
and leisure, (1 ¡ Nt), deliver the utility. To meet the objective, a household not only decide about how
much to consume and how much to work, but also decides about how much money to hold, since money
is the means of transaction in this economy and serves consumption-smoothing purposes. Households
face two constraints in their decisions. First, following Fuerst (1992), they need to hold cash in advance
in order to purchase consumption goods. The decision about Mc
t is made at the end of the period t ¡ 1.
Disposable income in period t is WtNt, where Wt is the nominal wage and Nt is the hours worked. A
budget constraint is the second constraint the households face. It equates the current period income from
labour (WtNt), ﬁnancial assets (Mc
t + (1 + id
t)Md
t ) and the ownership of ﬁrms (¦
f
t ) and banks (¦b
t),
to the value of current period consumption (Ptct) and the ﬁnancial portfolio carried to the next period


























t + WtNt ¸ Ptct; (A.2)
Mt+1 + Ptct = Mc
t + (1 + id
t)Md
















1¡² is the corresponding nominal price index, with Pt(i) being the price of the dif-
ferentiated good i. Nt is the hours worked, Mc
t is cash money, Md
t is deposit money, ¦
f
t is the proﬁt
from ﬁrm ownership, ¦b
t is the proﬁt from bank ownership, Wt is the nominal wage, and id
t is the
nominal return on the deposit money. "c





t being iid with zero mean and ﬁnite variance, and 0 < ½c < 1. ¯, Á
and Ã are scalars between 0 and 1, and ¾ > 1.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 33



























t + (1 + id
t)Md
t + WtNt + ¦
f
t + ¦b




















= ¡¸2;t + (1 + id




= ¡¸2;t + ¸1;t+1 + ¸2;t+1 = 0 (A.8)





























Having the relation for aggregate consumption, we also have to solve for the individual demand for

















where Ptct are the expenditures on the consumption bundle ct, and Pt(i) is the price of an individual







In summary, constraints (A.2)-(A.4) and equations (A.9), (A.10), and (A.13) describe the household’s
optimal decisions.34 Martin Fukaˇ c
Firms Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment. As such, to maximize their
proﬁts, they choose how much to produce, what price to charge, and how much labour to demand.
Following the timing in Fuerst (1992), management’s decisions are taken after the shocks to the economy
are realized. We assume that labour is the only production factor. To start production, a ﬁrm goes to the
labour market to hire workers. Once the output is produced and sold, the labour is paid out. When the
costs are covered, the ﬁrm transfers its net ﬁnancial position to households.











t (i) = Pt(i)yt(i)¡WtNt(i) is ﬁrm i’s nominal proﬁt and ©t+1 is the stochastic discount factor
deﬁned as ¯t+1=(ct+1Pt+1).4 Nt(i) is the labour demanded by ﬁrm i, and Pt(i) is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price
charged on the output yt(i). Note that the ﬁrm’s problem is in fact static and thus the ﬁrm maximizes
only ¦
f
t (i) subject to







(A.15) is the ﬁrm’s production function, where labour is the only production factor. The technology
associated with the labour is captured by At = exp("A
t ), where "A
t = ½A"A
t¡1 + ºA
t is the aggregate
technology shock, ºA
t is iid, zero mean and ﬁnite variance disturbance, 0 < ½A < 1. (A.16) is the
demand function for the consumption good ct(i) the ﬁrm produces.





































Rearranging it and using constraints (A.15)-(A.16) gives a set of conditions characterizing the optimal











4 It follows that if the ﬁrm acts in the best interests of the shareholder, the discount factor corresponds to the representative
household’s relative valuation of consumption across time.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 35
MCt are the ﬁrm’s nominal marginal costs, MCt =
WtNt(i)
yt(i) . (A.17) is the standard pricing rule in
monopolistic competition. The price is a ﬁxed markup over marginal costs. (A18) is the labour demand.
Note that these conditions characterize the ﬁrm’s optimal behavior in a frictionless environment.
To introduce persistence into the prices in the model, Calvo’s pricing scheme is assumed. The production
sector is monopolistically competitive and as such has control over prices. Calvo’s pricing mechanism
assumes that in every period only a fraction of ﬁrms, µ 2 (0;1), can adjust its price. The rest of the
ﬁrms, (1 ¡ µ), charge the same price as in the previous period. µ is often viewed as a price-stickiness
measure. The higher its value, the higher the degree of price persistence. Since the pricing mechanism
is well known and described in the literature, we will limit ourselves to its optimal solution.
Introducing Calvo’s pricing mechanism, the ﬁrm’s problem is no longer a static one. If a ﬁrm i is allowed
to change price in period t, it chooses to charge the optimal price
P¤




which is the discounted sum of the future expected marginal cost. Since we are in a monopolistically
competitive environment, note that the marginal cost here meets the ﬁrst order condition (A.17). This
speciﬁcation fully corresponds to the one employed in Gali and Gertler (1999). ¯ is the subjective
discount factor from the households’ problem. In this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrm takes into account the
possibility that it might not be allowed to change the price for some time from now on.
Introducing price persistence into the economy, the set of conditions (A.17)-(A18) characterizing the
ﬁrm’s optimal behavior in a monopolistically competitive environment is extended by the time dependent
Calvo pricing rule (A.19). The ﬁrm applies it only if it wins the lottery and is allowed to change the price.
Otherwise the ﬁrm charges the same price as in the previous period.
At this point, it is useful to determine the aggregate price level, since later we will be particularly inter-








The aggregate level in the sticky-price environment is a weighted average of past prices and new prices.










In summary, in the frictionless environment, the optimal behavior of the ﬁrm is given by equations
(A.17)-(A18). If the Calvo pricing rule is introduced, (A.19) also applies. It is employed if the ﬁrm is
allowed to change its price. Otherwise, it charges the price from the last period.36 Martin Fukaˇ c
Monetary Authority The monetary policy, in order to anchor the nominal side of the economy, is
assumed to follow the targeting rule
iCB
t = µ¼ (Et¼t+1 ¡ ¼¤) + µxEtxt+1; (A.21)
where iCB
t is the policy instrument, ¼t+1 is the inﬂation rate between periods t and t + 1, xt+1 is the
output gap in the t + 1 period (see the deﬁnition below), and ¼¤ is the inﬂation target. The target is set
exogenously by the central bank and constitutes a nominal anchor for the economy (solving the nominal
indeterminacy problem). According to the rule, the central bank sets its policy instrument iCB
t on the
basis of the expected deviation of inﬂation from the target in the next period, and the expected output
gap. µ¼ and µx characterize the bank’s preferences with respect to inﬂation stabilization and/or to output
gap stabilization. The higher the value of µ, the more vigilant the bank is. The reason for the choice of
policy rule (A.21) is twofold. First, the choice is motivated by the empirical evidence of Clarida et al.
(2000), who argue for this type of rule. Second, Bullard and Mitra (2002) ﬁnd that this type of rule is
robust to deliver rational expectations equilibrium determinacy and E-stability, which is required for the
analysis below.
Model Equilibrium








1. households maximize their lifetime welfare (A1) subject to constraints (A2)-(A4);
2. monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximize their present-value proﬁt (A14) constrained by
(A.15)-(A.16);
3. perfectly competitive private banks maximize their proﬁt;
4. the central bank meets its inﬂation target and zero-output-gap objectives; and
5. the labour market, money market, and goods market clear.








1. households maximize their lifetime welfare (A1) subject to constraints (A2)-(A4);
2. monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximize their present-value proﬁt (A14) constrained by
(A.15)-(A.16), and Calvo’s pricing principle allows the ﬁrm to set an optimal price according
to (A.19) if it is allowed to change its price, otherwise Pt(i) = Pt¡1(i) ;
3. perfectly competitive private banks maximize their proﬁt;
4. the central bank meets its inﬂation target and zero-output-gap objectives; and
5. the labour market, money market, and goods market clear.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 37
Log-Linearized Model and Aggregate Equilibrium
From now on we focus our attention particularly on the aggregate dynamics. We log-linearize the sticky-
price model and describe its aggregate-level dynamics. Because we concentrate speciﬁcally on the dy-
namics of output and inﬂation, we concentrate on the IS and Phillips curves.
First we derive the IS curve, which characterizes the dynamics of output around its steady state. The
derivation is straightforward and follows the same strategy as Ravenna and Walsh (2003) and Malik
(2004). We log-linearize the Euler equation from the household’s problem (A10) to get
ct = Etct+1 ¡ ¾(id
t ¡ Et¼t+1) + ¾"c
t: (A.22)




xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(id
t ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
f




t is the real interest rate that arises in the frictionless equilibrium and y
f
t is the output in the






































t is the nominal interest rate in the frictionless equilibrium. For computational convenience and
without loss of generality, we will assume that this rate is equal to zero.
Eliminating r
f
t from the above equation for the output gap we get
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(id







t. Recalling the properties of "A
t and "c
t and further assuming
½A = ½c = ½, vt follows an AR(1) process5. Equation (A.23) constitutes the IS curve as a function of
the expected future output gap and the ex ante real interest rate.
Second, we derive for the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Log-linearizing and combining (A19) and
(A20) we obtain
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 +
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ µ¯)
½
mct; (A.24)
where mct is the log of real marginal costs. To eliminate the marginal costs, we plug (A.17) into (A18)
and divide both sides by Pt; we obtain the real marginal costs. Log-linearizing that under the perfect
knowledge assumption gives
mct = wt ¡ pt ¡ "A
t : (A.25)
5 The process is vt = ½vt¡1 + º
v
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¡ lnÃ + "c
t:
Substituting this expression back to (A24) gives the New Keynesian Phillips curve
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ¸xt + ut; (A.26)
where ° =
(1¡µ)(1¡µ¯)
µ , ¸ = °
1+¾Á
¾ , and ut = "c
t, assuming ² = 1
1¡Ã.Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 39
Appendix B
MSV representation
Using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients, we derive the exact form of the minimum state variable
(MSV) representation for the model considered in the text. Starting with the reduced form (2.9) and
assuming rational expectations, i.e., ^ EP
t (:) = ^ ECB
t (:) = Et(:), we get
yt = M0 + (M1 + M2)Etyt+1 + P²t; (A.27)
where
²t = F²t¡1 + "t:
Now assume the MSV form takes the form
yt = a + b²t: (A.28)
Taking the appropriate expectations needed in (A.27) one obtains
Etyt+1 = a + bF²t;
Plugging these expectations back into (A.27) yields
yt = M0 + (M1 + M2)a + [(M1 + M2)bF + P]²t: (A.29)
Using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients, it follows that the MSV solution must satisfy
M0 + (M1 + M2)a = a;
(M1 + M2)bF + P = b:
Solving for the matrices a, and b we get
a = (I ¡ M1 ¡ M2)¡1M0; (A.30)
vec(b) = [I ¡ F0 ­ (M1 + M2)]¡1vec(P);40 Martin Fukaˇ c
Appendix C
Here we derive the matrices used in Proposition 2 on page 14.
Having the map from the PLMs to ALM
T[a;b] =
h
M0 + (M1 + M2)^ at;P + (M1 + M2)^ btF)
i
:









P + (M1 + M2)^ bt
i
= F0 ­ (M1 + M2):Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning 41
Appendix D
Optimal Expectations-Based Policy Rule












t+i + (1 ¡ ®)(¼t+i ¡ ¼¤)2¤
)
subject to
xt = ^ ECB
t xt+1 ¡ ¾
³
it ¡ ^ ECB
t ¼t+1
´
¼t = ¸xt + ¯ ^ ECB
t ¼t+1:
Note that the central bank assumes that the private sector trust the bank’s expectations and adopts them
for their own decisions. The central bank a priory assumes that monetary policy is credible. Further, we
assume the bank does not observe current period exogenous shocks ut and vt.
The ﬁrst order condition to the problem is
®xt + ®(1 ¡ ®)(¼t ¡ ¼¤) = 0:
Using the FOC, the Phillips curve and IS curve to solve for it, we obtain the optimal policy rule under
discretion. When we assume that the inﬂation target ¼¤ is zero, then the expectations-based policy rule
takes the form
it = µ0 + µ¼ ^ ECB
t ¼t+1 + µx ^ ECB
t xt+1;
where µ¼ = 1 +
(1¡®)¸¯
¸2(1¡®)+®, and µx = 1
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